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Abstract 
 
Blockchain technology is often referred to as a groundbreaking innovation and the 
harbinger of a new economic era. Blockchain might engender a new type of 
economic system, the blockchain economy. In the blockchain economy, agreed-
upon transactions would be enforced autonomously following rules defined by smart 
contracts. The blockchain economy would manifest itself in a new form of 
organizational design—decentralized autonomous organizations (DAO)—which are 
organizations with governance rules specified in the blockchain. We discuss the 
blockchain economy along dimensions defined in the IT governance literature: 
decision rights, accountability, and incentives. Our case study of a DAO illustrates 
that governance in the blockchain economy might radically depart from established 
notions of governance. Using the three governance dimensions, we propose a novel 
IT governance framework and a research agenda for governance in the blockchain 
economy. We challenge common assumptions in the blockchain discourse, and 
propose promising information systems research related to those assumptions. 
 
Keywords: Blockchain, distributed ledger technology, smart contracts, 
decentralized autonomous organization, governance, agency theory, decision rights, 
accountability, incentives 
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1. Introduction 
 
Some argue that the blockchain economy is emerging, requiring new 
governance approaches (Niederman et al., 2017). We illustrate this 
blockchain economy and explore the case of an emerging decentralized 
autonomous organization (DAO) to explore decision rights, accountability, 
and incentives related to governance (Weill, 2004). Building on Weill’s work, 
we provide a novel IT governance framework and a research agenda to 
examine changes to governance that may accompany the emergence of the 
blockchain economy. A recent paper suggests a practical research agenda 
for studying blockchain (Risius & Spohrer, 2017). Our effort is aimed at 
theorizing in information systems (IS) research, and challenging implicit 
assumptions from the blockchain discourse. We shed light on some “dark” 
issues of blockchain, and identify important avenues for research concerning 
governance in the blockchain economy.  
 
Blockchain can be described as a decentralized, transactional 
database technology that facilitates validated, tamper-resistant transactions 
consistent across a large number of network participants called nodes 
(Glaser, 2017). Blockchain is a class of technologies (sometimes called 
distributed ledger technologies) that give users confidence 
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information (e.g., a certificate) has not been tampered with. In principle, this 
guarantees a “single truth” across different agents who may or may not trust 
each other. Not surprisingly, financial services has been one of the first 
industries to express an interest in blockchain (Beck & Müller-Bloch, 2017; 
Walsh et al., 2016). For centuries, the financial industry has relied on double-
entry bookkeeping as a trustworthy method of determining “who owns what” 
and “who owes whom.” In addition to financial services, however, blockchain 
technology has also been explored in other industries, for instance, as a 
means of reducing uncertainty in supply chains (Nærland, Müller-Bloch, 
Beck, & Palmund, 2017), fostering environmental sustainability (Chapron, 
2017), and preventing fraudulent tax returns (Hyvärinen, Risius, & Friis, 
2017). 
 
Recently, academia has also expressed interest in blockchain (Beck, 
Avital, Rossi, & Thatcher, 2017; Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). Thus far, most 
academic research has focused on cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin (e.g., 
Böhme, Christin, Edelman, & Moore, 2015; Kazan, Tan, & Lim, 2015; Li & 
Wang, 2017; Nakamoto, 2008); however, blockchain has since evolved 
beyond Bitcoin. The release of the freely programmable Ethereum blockchain 
in 2014 enabled smart contracts, software code that runs exactly as 
programmed without risk of downtime, censorship, or fraud (Buterin, 2014). 
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Smart contracts facilitate many different kinds of transactions, going far 
beyond cryptocurrency transfer. 
 
Little is known about the implications of blockchain for the governance 
of economic activities. Blockchain and the smart contracts it enables could 
give rise to a new type of economic system, which we refer to here as the 
blockchain economy. While the digital economy, where “goods and services 
traded are in digital format” (Kim, Barua, & Whinston, 2002), has become 
omnipresent (Bharadwaj, El Sawy, Pavlou, & Venkatraman, 2013), the 
blockchain economy extends beyond the digital economy in that agreed-upon 
transactions are autonomously enforced, following rules defined in smart 
contracts. The blockchain economy might enable new organizational designs 
in form of DAOs, autonomous entities using governance rules that conform to 
the business logic of the blockchain (Jentzsch, n.d.). Established notions of 
governance are challenged in the blockchain economy. Comparing the 
blockchain economy to the digital economy we provide a research framework 
and agenda for governance in the blockchain economy.  
 
2. Literature Background 
 
For purposes of this analysis, we consider blockchain to be a 
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foundational technology for the blockchain economy. The theoretical 
foundations for this paper are drawn from the relevant IT governance 
literature. In this section we discuss the foundations of the blockchain 
technology, introduce the idea of the blockchain economy, and discuss the 
issue of governance. 
 
2.1. Blockchain Foundations 
 
Whatever the future of blockchain may be, at this point it is widely 
assumed to be highly important. Some researchers describe it as being as 
important as the Internet due to its attendant impacts on business and 
society (e.g., Beck, 2018). Research suggests that blockchain has the 
capacity to reduce uncertainty, insecurity, and ambiguity in transactions by 
providing full transactional disclosure and producing a single truth for all 
network participants (Beck, Czepluch, Lollike, & Malone, 2016; Nærland et 
al., 2017).  
 
Technically, a blockchain is a tamper-resistant, decentralized 
database of transactions consistent across a base of decentralized nodes 
(Glaser, 2017). It is cryptographically armored against retrospective 
manipulations, and uses a consensus mechanism to ensure database 
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consistency whenever new transactions are validated. All transactions saved 
on the blockchain are stored in blocks; transaction data are stored within the 
blocks in a cryptographic data structure, the most common being Merkle 
trees. In Merkle trees, transactions are hashed and repeatedly paired, 
merged, and rehashed until only one hash remains, the Merkle root. Each 
block saves the Merkle root of the previous block. This creates a chain of 
data that are cryptographically secured and linked. Any retrospective attempt 
to change a transaction necessitates rehashing not only the block that 
contains the transaction, but all subsequent blocks as well. While this is 
theoretically possible, it is highly implausible, since other nodes are 
constantly adding new blocks to the ever-expanding blockchain (Underwood, 
2016). Consensus mechanisms encourage the nodes to validate new 
transactions and discourage them from creating alternative histories of 
transactions. These consensus mechanisms often employ economic 
incentives to keep the database consistent. The most common consensus 
mechanisms are proof-of-work and proof-of-stake. Proof-of-work requires 
solving a computationally expensive cryptographic puzzle. The node that first 
finds the solution to the puzzle validates the next block, and is remunerated 
with cryptocurrency. In proof-of-stake, nodes with more cryptocurrency 
(larger stakes) have higher probabilities of being chosen to validate the next 
block. The stake may be destroyed if the node behaves maliciously, which 
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thus discourages such behavior (see also Tschorsch & Scheuermann, 2016). 
 
The ability to read blockchain data and submit new transactions is 
determined by access to transactions. Public blockchains allow all nodes to 
read blockchain data and propose new transactions, whereas private 
blockchains allow only nodes that are preregistered by a central authority to 
read blockchain data and submit new transactions (see Table 1). Public 
blockchains offer either permissioned or permissionless access to transaction 
validation. In permissionless blockchains, all nodes can validate transactions, 
while in permissioned blockchains, only nodes that have been preregistered 
can validate transactions (Peters & Panayi, 2016).  
 
Table 1. Blockchain Typology	
Access to 
Transactions	
Access to Transaction Validation	
 Permissioned Permissionless	
Public	 All nodes can read and submit 
transactions. Only authorized nodes 
can validate transactions.	
All nodes can read, submit, and 
validate transactions.	
Private	 Only authorized nodes can read, 
submit, and validate transactions.	
Not applicable	
 
2.2. The Blockchain Economy 
 
The first blockchain enabled only the transfer of digital tokens, in this 
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case the cryptocurrency Bitcoin, and was not used for other more 
sophisticated transactions. The launch of Ethereum showed it was possible 
to program blockchains to support many kinds of transactional logics through 
smart contracts that execute precoded pieces of software on the blockchain 
when specific conditions are met (Buterin, 2014). Smart contracts can 
execute transactions autonomously, without interference from agents or the 
need for approval from third parties. They can be embedded into digital 
assets or into the digital representation of physical assets in the form of 
tokens that enforce autonomous contract fulfillment (Szabo, 1994). For 
instance, through smart contracts, it might become possible to autonomously 
and remotely lock a leased car if the owner failed to fulfill leasing obligations. 
The blockchain ensures that contracts are fulfilled and not corrupted. 
 
For our purposes, we presume that smart contracts will precipitate the 
blockchain economy, a new type of economic system where agreed-upon 
transactions can be enforced autonomously according to rules defined in the 
contracts. The blockchain economy could potentially facilitate machine-to-
machine coordination within the Internet of things (e.g., Christidis & 
Devetsikiotis, 2016; Zhang & Wen, 2017), or the creation of decentralized 
electronic marketplaces (e.g., Subramanian, 2018; Wörner, von Bomhard, 
Schreier, & Bilgeri, 2016). The blockchain economy would manifest itself in 
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new forms of organizations called DAOs, in which governance might be 
decentralized in contrast to the governance of organizations common today 
(e.g., Swan, 2015; Wright & De Filippi, 2015). The blockchain economy idea 
is based on a new kind of governance. 
 
2.3. Governance  
 
We use the theoretical perspective of IT governance, a topic of 
interest for several decades (see Brown & Grant, 2005, for an overview). 
Weill (2004, p. 3) says, “IT governance represents the framework for decision 
rights and accountabilities to encourage desirable behavior in the use of IT”. 
Weill’s definition invokes three key dimensions of IT governance: decision 
rights, accountability, and incentives.  
 
 Decision rights concern the rights governing control over certain 
assets. Fama and Jensen (1983) describe two types of decision rights. 
Decision management rights allow generating decision proposals, and 
executing or implementing decisions. Decision control rights allow ratification 
of decisions (deciding whether decisions are to be implemented) and 
monitoring decisions (measuring performance of decision agents). Decision 
rights, in general, determine the degree of centralization, that is, whether 
decision-making power is concentrated in a single person or small group 
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(centralized), or dispersed (decentralized) (King, 1983; Sambamurthy & 
Zmud, 1999). 
 
The right to monitor decisions is linked to accountability.  To be called 
‘to account’ for one’s actions is the core sense of this (Mulgan, 2000), but is 
only one part of an accountability relationship. Agents providing an account 
must address actions taken and consequences incurred. Enforcement 
mechanisms are crucial (Burritt & Welch, 1997); decision management rights 
are often separated from decision control rights to avoid self-monitoring, self-
reward, and self-punishment (Moldoveanu & Martin, 2001). Accountability is 
enacted, specified and brought into force, through contracts and legal 
frameworks governed by institutions, but it can also be enacted through IT 
infrastructures (Weitzner et al., 2008)—an important consideration for 
blockchain. 
 
Incentives are underemphasized in Weill’s discussion, but have been 
recognized as central to IS design (Ba, Stallaert, & Whinston, 2001). 
Incentives motivate agents to act. Jensen and Meckling (1976) address two 
types of incentives: Pecuniary incentives relate observable agent behavior to 
monetary reward (or reward that can be monetized). Non-pecuniary 
incentives relate observable agent behaviour to non-monetary reward, such 
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as privileges, visibility, or reputation. Incentive alignment occurs “when the 
system’s embedded features induce users to employ the system consistent 
with the design objective” (Ba, Stallaert, & Whinston, 2001, p. 227). A system 
with aligned incentives makes agents free to choose their own behaviour but 
inclined to choose actions that coincide with goals of the system’s design. 
 
These governance dimensions are anchored in agency theory or 
principal-agent theory (Moldoveanu & Martin, 2001), in which one party (the 
principal) delegates work to another party (the agent). The objective is to 
resolve problems in cases where principals and agents have conflicting 
desires, goals, or attitudes toward risk (Akerlof, 1970; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory is a lens to view allocation of 
decision rights, to determine how parties are to be held accountable, and 
how incentives can be used to overcome diverging goals (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). While these theoretical perspectives are common to both economics 
and political science, the analysis here takes primarily an economics 
perspective. 
 
3. The Swarm City Case  
 
In order to explore governance issues we analyzed a blockchain case. 
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Swarm City1 developed out of its predecessor, Arcade City, and was founded 
in 2017 as a loosely coupled network of software engineers working on the 
development of an Ethereum-based blockchain application to empower 
sharing economy platforms. Swarm City is an entrepreneurial network of like-
minded developers seeking to disrupt the sharing economy and the platforms 
that act as central authorities and create markets to facilitate transactions. In 
today’s sharing economy, platform owners are remunerated for providing 
services, typically through a transaction fee. Their business models have 
been criticized for exploitative labor practices, and strong network effects 
have made some sharing economy platforms quasi-monopolistic 
organizations that capture monopoly rents (The Economist, 2014). These 
quasi-monopolies are a concern for regulators and politicians alike.  
 
Swarm City seeks to provide a blockchain application for the sharing 
economy that facilitates building disintermediated sharing economy 
platforms. Developers can customize the design of sharing economy 
platforms by choosing application areas (e.g., ride sharing) or by defining 
governance rules (e.g., whether or not transaction fees are charged). Swarm 
City envisions developing a market for blockchain-based sharing economy 
platforms, where different types of platforms compete with each other. As 
                                                
1 https://swarm.city/ 
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such, Swarm City serves as an example of how blockchain might engender 
the blockchain economy and challenges our understanding of IT governance.  
 
Since there was no well-defined company or location where we could 
conduct interviews or harvest secondary data, our data collection followed an 
unconventional approach. Our collected data include the original Arcade City 
white paper, as well as posts from the Swarm City blog (press.swarm.city). 
We conducted five interviews with Swarm City developers between 
December 2016 and February 2017, and three additional interviews in 
February 2018. Each interview was open-ended and semistructured, lasting 
40-90 minutes, with an average duration of slightly over 60 minutes. Data 
sampling aligned with preconceptions about challenges in blockchain 
governance, but was open to allow for new theoretical insights (Urquhart, 
Lehmann, & Myers, 2010). We gathered more than 110 pages of interview 
transcriptions plus secondary data (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Data Collection	
Type of Data	 Number of Pages	
Interviews (8 interviews with 8 individuals associated with Swarm City: 
business leader, principal cofounder, cofounder, system architect, 
software engineer, liaison officer, communication officer, member of 
advisory board)	
111	
Swarm City blog posts (49 blog posts from press.swarm.city)	 215 
Arcade City (predecessor of Swarm City) white paper	 17	
Total	 343	
 
We formulated the problem (Van de Ven, 2007), designed the case 
study (Yin, 2000), and engaged in data collection and analysis. This led to 
theoretical insights using a pluralistic strategy (Mingers, 2001). The work was 
inspired by Mingers’ (2004) recommendation of pragmatics. We embraced 
different research perspectives to construct “a useful model of reality” (Van 
de Ven, 2007), and followed the principle of emergence from grounded 
theory of fitting insights to the data under study (Glaser & Strauss, 2008). By 
employing such techniques we increased theoretical scope and 
conceptualization, treating literature about governance as additional data 
points for analysis (Urquhart et al., 2010). Our background of blockchain 
workshops, panels, and events informed the work.  
 
3.1. Decision Rights 
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Unlike Airbnb or Uber, the ownership of Swarm City is ostensibly 
organized in a decentralized fashion. However, this form of ownership is 
limited to decision rights and does not include additional property rights, 
since anyone can copy the code that instantiates Swarm City and use it. 
According to a Swarm City business leader: “There is no real ownership. . . . 
If anybody wants to copy the code and create his own project from this, he 
can do this.”  
 
Swarm City developers intend to make the code (and the application 
itself) increasingly decentralized and autonomous once it is implemented. 
However, in its current developmental stage, decision rights are highly 
centralized in what Swarm City developers consider a necessary “benevolent 
dictatorship.” They say initial “centrality” is a prerequisite for “decentrality” 
later. As a system architect explained:  
“The first governance structure you might say is something like a 
dictatorship. . . . The reason we do this is because we believe that for 
building [Swarm City] as a tool, you [need] a military style way. . . . 
What we are trying to build is of course a totally decentralized open 
platform, that is open source and anyone can use, can add value to. 
But in order to make the tools, we need to do the governance in a 
really hierarchical way.” 
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However, the Swarm City development team does plan to relinquish 
control once initial development is complete. As a business leader explained:  
“Our goal is to go from centralized governance to decentralized 
governance over the period of time. That’s something that is totally on 
our roadmap . . . , for [us who] are deciding now to become obsolete 
so we don’t . . . have that kind of control, that kind of decision-making 
power for eternity in Swarm City. The aim would be that all the people 
using Swarm City . . . have a decentralized way of managing it.”  
 
Swarm city developers did express some concern about the allocation 
of decision rights. In the future, token owners might make joint management 
decisions (e.g., concerning new features or whether to offer certain services), 
but this joint decision-making may not always be feasible. Another approach 
might be to separate decision management rights from decision control 
rights, similar to traditional corporations. As a software engineer clarified:  
“Owning a number of shares allows you to have a voting right in the 
decision-making of the company and then you have a board of 
directors that are doing the day-to-day management of the company. 
That would be some people appointed by these Swarm token 
holders.”  
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This suggests that the blockchain economy might have some 
centralization. However, there are also tendencies towards a decentralized 
locus of control. In particular, users offering services via Swarm City would 
be able to determine their pricing without inference from a third party. As a 
business leader explained:  
“Uber always says how much I can earn per kilometre, per ride. So it's 
not really something I can decide. . . . We think that the people owning 
the item or the skill [they offer], they should decide how much they 
want to ask for and then they will see how the market will react to it.”  
 
Decisions might be disputed, so resolving disagreements in decision 
making will be necessary. A drastic resolution is to fork the project, copying 
the code and setting up an alternative, competing project. Swarm City forked 
off from Arcade City due to Swarm City individuals who disagreed with 
decisions of Arcade City management. In the words of one of the Swarm City 
cofounders: “Arcade City’s still running, but we forked off into a separate 
organization, ‘cause we had a certain way of wanting to do things”.  
 
3.2. Accountability 
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In Swarm City, legal risks and obligations are delegated to the network 
participants. Our findings indicate that the claims that blockchain will entirely 
eliminate institutional engagement are exaggerated, since compliance with 
legal institutions will continue to be necessary in the blockchain economy. 
However, Swarm City neither assumes liability for the transactions it hosts 
nor does it compel its users to comply with legal regulations, since it 
perceives itself as merely facilitating peer-to-peer transactions. According to 
a software engineer: 
I think that people who offer some kind of a peer-to-peer service, like 
ride sharing, in their local area, they should comply with the local 
regulations . . . . But it is up to the people who deliver the service to 
comply with those rules . . . . We are not intermediaries, we just offer a 
platform and in the end [we are enabling] a transaction on the 
blockchain, a peer-to-peer transaction, and we are not involved in that. 
 
Swarm City users may assume some legal liability for engaging in 
economic exchange, but mitigation mechanisms such as escrow and dispute-
resolution assistance will be built into the system. Escrow can be entirely 
governed by a smart contract, but fulfilment of contract conditions might not 
be determined autonomously if transactions are bound to conditions the 
transacting parties must agree to after the fact. In such cases dispute 
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resolution mechanisms are necessary, but implementing such mechanisms 
in smart contracts is difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, institutional 
engagement may be necessary to resolve conflicts. As the Swarm City 
liaison officer explains:  
Both [contractual] parties put money on a smart contract once they 
engage in a . . . transaction, [for instance] the ride sharing. The driver 
and the rider put money on the contract, in the end it has to be 
released. So if one of the parties is not satisfied or has a dispute, then 
. . . there will be another service like “dispute resolution” . . . that will 
be in the ecosystem. So it’s another smart contract that gets triggered 
and there will be a person that steps in that has to resolve this 
problem. 
 
Swarm City grants identity using a public address in the blockchain 
network.  The user needs this identity to engage in transactions. However, a 
user can also choose to use several public addresses. Moreover, the user 
can decide to remain pseudonymous. Swarm City tries to encourage users to 
identify themselves by tying all public addresses to reputation scores 
transferred across the sharing economy applications within Swarm City. This 
would make it easy for users to switch to new applications, and can be 
implemented fully on blockchain without institutional engagement. As a 
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business leader explains: “You can earn reputation in riding, you can earn 
reputation in hosting or giving, renting out your apartment and so forth. And 
this gives you sort of a more realistic view of the person.”  
 
3.3. Incentives 
 
Swarm City’s objective is to cut fees and redistribute to users the 
value currently captured by incumbent owners of sharing economy platforms. 
Swarm City seeks to remove intermediaries currently responsible for creating 
and governing sharing economy markets by transferring transactions and 
governance to blockchain in the context of a peer-to-peer economy. As the 
liaison officer states:  
“The big difference with what we are building and with what blockchain 
can bring and how we want to bring blockchain to the people is that . . 
. almost all the value that you [create] will stay with you. So if I rent out 
a room in my house I [create] that value, if I rent it out to you I want 
that value coming to me. So [there is] no central party that is going to 
come in and claim a percentage of it.” 
 
It is hoped that lower transaction fees will incentivize the use of Swarm 
City. There will also be behavior-influencing incentives; for example, offering 
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Swarm City users the opportunity to build a reputation that can be transferred 
across platforms. As a cofounder explains:  
“And the ones with the really high reputations, people are inclined to 
trust them more, but the people with lower reputations are more 
inclined to offer cheaper services and try and do their best to build up 
their reputation, because if they don't, then they won't make any 
money, and then what’s the point of them being there.”  
 
Swarm City’s core developer team intends to implement a fee system 
to reimburse those who maintain the infrastructure, thus creating an incentive 
for developers to propose new features. According to the liaison officer:   
“There will be a small fee, but we are talking about one percent 
maximum, to sustain the platform. If there are some things to be 
sustained, if some bugs appear or something, that will need to get 
fixed . . . . We would like to have it more like a cooperative platform 
and not like all money coming to one central point and being dispersed 
from there.” 
 
Swarm City developers also derived benefits from issuing their own 
cryptocurrency. The proceeds from the issuance were used to finance the 
development of Swarm City. In the future, this cryptocurrency might be used 
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to pay for transactions in Swarm City and might include voting rights or 
participation in decision-making. At present, the main motivation for 
developing Swarm City is ideological—to drive societal change. A blog post 
dated June 2, 2017 states: “Now is the time to change society. We all feel it’s 
up to us to try and become the change we want to see in this world.”  
 
For creators of the individual sharing economy applications run by the 
Swarm City infrastructure, there is a monetary incentive to set up club goods, 
since they can embed a transaction fee in their application. Club goods are 
typically co-created and used by members and not owned by a single party. 
However, due to the competition of sharing economy applications, it is hoped 
that applications with minimal transaction fees will emerge, turning these 
applications into de-facto non-excludable goods and thus into public goods. 
Public goods are both non-excludable and non-rivalrous in consumption, 
which is why there are typically not well-functioning market mechanisms for 
providing them. It is hoped that the Swarm City infrastructure will change 
that. As a software engineer explains:  
“The thing that I think we are changing the game with is that . . . 
everybody [will be able] to create these [sharing economy] storefronts 
and to suggest their own business model on top of it. You could even 
try [to charge] a 30 percent fee like Uber but I imagine that nobody will 
 24 
 
use that because there will be other options with much smaller fees – 
or a zero fee.” 
 
Incentives play a crucial role in blockchain; while incentives are a key factor 
for eliciting desirable behavior by those developing, maintaining, and using 
Swarm City, they are also indispensable for ensuring that the underlying 
blockchain infrastructure (Ethereum, in the case of Swarm City) functions 
effectively. 
 
4. Future IS Governance Research on Blockchain 
 
As contrasted with the digital economy, the blockchain economy, 
challenges established notions of governance. Our research agenda is 
established to explore governance in the blockchain economy. We conclude 
by examining common assumptions in the blockchain discourse. 
 
4.1. Extended IT Governance Framework 
 
The Swarm City case clearly demonstrates that the emergence of the 
blockchain economy demands a rethinking of governance. At this early point 
in development, drawing from limited literature and early-stage case studies, 
it is not possible to see how blockchain will evolve, but we can begin to 
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evaluate how the radical changes foreseen for blockchain might affect 
governance. By juxtaposing the blockchain economy and the digital economy 
along the governance areas of decision rights, accountability, and incentives, 
it is clear that the blockchain economy changes how we view governance 
(see Table 3). The blockchain economy’s emphasis on decentralizing 
decision rights and the technical enactment of accountability underscores the 
importance of incentive alignment. However, as our case study suggests, 
these changes are fraught with tensions and conflicts, especially concerning 
the degree of centralization and how accountability is enacted. We continue 
here by discussing the three governance areas in terms of the blockchain 
economy using the novel IT governance framework illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Table 3. Blockchain Economy Governance 	  
Dimension	 Property 
(Range)	
Digital Economy	 Blockchain Economy	 Selected Codes/Indicators	
Decision rights	 Degree of 
centralization 
(centralized—
decentralized)	
● The specification of 
decision rights is a known 
hierarchically organized 
contracting process. 
Implicit and explicit 
contracts define behavior in 
organizations.	
● Records are decided 
upon centrally.	
● Strict property rights 
prevent forking as a mode 
of resolving disagreement 
about decision-making.	
● Transaction parameters 
are primarily defined 
centrally.	
 
● The specification of 
decision rights needs to be 
organized in a 
decentralized environment. 
Implicit and explicit 
contracts are either not 
available or are solely 
managed by blockchain, 
making technology the 
foundation of the network 
instead of written 
agreements.	
● Records are decided 
upon decentrally through 
consensus.	
● Forking as a novel 
mode of decentrally 
resolving disagreement 
about decision-making.	
● Transaction parameters 
are primarily defined 
decentrally.	
● Initial high degree of 
centralized decision rights 
to enable decentralized 
control later on.	
● Benevolent dictatorship 
(overcoming acute 
emergency situations, 
system design)	
● Decentralized decision-
making (setting transaction 
parameters, voting on 
proposals)	
● Hybrid (centralized 
decision management rights 
and decentralized decision 
control rights)	
● Resolving disagreement 
about decision-making 
(forking, voicing 
disagreement)	
Accountability	 Enactment 
(institutional – 
technical)	
● Network as “nexus of 
contracts”.	
● Accountability specified 
in interpersonal as well as 
inter- and 
intraorganizational settings.	
● Network as “nexus of 
smart contracts”.	
● Accountability specified 
in the network, delegated 
to and by the blockchain. 	
● Identity (technical origin, 
institutional verification, 
reputation, liability)	
● Transaction 
enforcement (smart-
contract-based escrow, 
institutional involvement)	
Incentives	 Alignment 
(aligned – 
unaligned)	
● Digital processes in 
hierarchies for value 
creation of digital goods.	
● Incentive to create 
private goods and club 
goods.	
● Digital processes in 
peer-to-peer exchanges for 
value creation of 
blockchain-based digital 
goods.	
● Incentives to create 
private goods, club goods, 
and public goods.	
● New network-based 
processes which 
incentivize the peer-to-peer 
nodes to reach consensus.	
● Incentives for technical 
consensus	
● Incentives for system 
development and 
maintenance	
● Incentives for users	
● Incentives for token 
holders	
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Figure 1. Extended IT Governance Framework  
 
The blockchain literature and our case study suggest that the locus of 
decision rights in the blockchain economy will be more decentralized than in 
the digital economy. The nature of consensus-making underlines this 
development in particular. The locus of making consensus is decentralized, 
which means that the records that form the foundation of the blockchain 
economy are not only kept in a decentralized manner, but also decided upon 
in a decentralized manner. Moreover, disagreements can be resolved in a 
decentralized manner if users initiate forks by copying existing code and 
developing it further according to their goals. Our case study illustrates that 
beyond consensus-making or forking, concrete models for decentralizing 
 28 
 
decision rights are still under development. Smart contracts might allow for 
decentralized governance mechanisms, but the blockchain economy at 
present continues to be characterized by a high degree of centralized 
decision-making. In particular, for effective system design, the concept of the 
“benevolent dictatorship” is deemed necessary. This illustrates that even 
though the blockchain economy shifts the focus toward decentralized forms 
of decision-making, there is still a high degree of centralization at this point. 
 
In the blockchain economy, accountability in principle will increasingly 
be enacted technically instead of institutionally. Smart contracts allow for 
specifying and enforcing accountability. However, in some cases it may not 
be possible to implement autonomous transaction enforcement; thus, there 
will be disputes and institutional involvement will be necessary to resolve 
these disputes. A key accountability issue concerns identity in the blockchain 
environment, ostensibly granted through the public addresses that are used 
to conduct transactions in the blockchain economy. Given multiple and 
pseudonymous identities, this could be a problem. While many users will 
wish to identify themselves using more traditional institutional means (e.g., 
driver licenses linked to their blockchain identities), a more technical 
approach to instantiate identity in the blockchain economy would be to link 
reputation scores to public addresses, as the Swarm City case illustrates. 
 29 
 
Overall, the shift toward the technical enactment of accountability has only 
begun, and we expect that institutions will continue to play important roles for 
accountability in the blockchain economy for some time to come. 
 
As the blockchain economy emerges, incentive alignment becomes 
increasingly important. While incentives are at the core of all economic 
activity, including the digital economy, the blockchain economy adds a new 
dimension. Incentives are absolutely crucial for the blockchain economy to 
function effectively, because incentives are necessary to achieve the 
consensus that forms the backbone of the blockchain economy. Unless 
incentives are properly aligned, the nodes of the blockchain will not 
contribute to consensus. Improper incentive alignment threatens the integrity 
of the entire blockchain and makes the blockchain economy impossible. 
 
4.2. Research Agenda for Governance in the Blockchain Economy  
 
The blockchain economy demands a reassessment of established 
notions of governance. How exactly governance will change in the emerging 
blockchain economy is however still little understood. Nevertheless, the 
promise of the blockchain economy is dependent on the implementation of 
effective governance mechanisms, which are, in turn, dependent on a 
thorough understanding of the phenomenon. Table 4 summarizes our 
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research agenda, which serves as fruitful ground for further theoretical work.  
 
Table 4. Research Agenda for Governance in the Blockchain Economy	
Dimension	 Research Questions	
Decision rights	
 
 
● How are decisions made in the blockchain economy? 	
● How are decision management rights and decision control rights allocated?	
● How is disagreement about decision-making resolved in the blockchain economy?	
● What is the role of ownership in the blockchain economy?	
Accountability	 ● How is accountability determined in the blockchain economy?	
● How is identity engrained in the blockchain economy?	
● How is transaction enforcement embedded in the blockchain economy?	
● How are disputed transactions resolved in the blockchain economy?	
● How is trust affected by the blockchain economy?	
● What is the role of institutions in the blockchain economy?	
Incentives 	 ● How is consensus incentivized in the blockchain economy?	
● How does incentive alignment work in the blockchain economy?	
● How is system use incentivized in the blockchain economy?	
● How is system development and maintenance incentivized in the blockchain economy?	
● How do business models shape the blockchain economy?	
 
Future research should investigate how decision rights are allocated in 
the blockchain economy. As the Swarm City case illustrates, blockchain is 
subject to both instances of centralized as well as decentralized decision-
making. Further research should analyze when centralized vs. decentralized 
decision rights are advantageous, and explore the mechanisms of transition 
from one to the other. Similarly, research is needed to articulate how 
decision-making works, and who is allowed to decide what kinds of things 
under what circumstances? Are decision management rights and decision 
control rights held by the same individuals or separated, and how does this 
affect the effectiveness of decision-making? The separation of decision 
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management rights and decision control rights has already been discussed in 
Swarm City in the context of professional management agents and token 
holders who might have voting rights. Resolution of disagreements about 
decision-making in the blockchain economy also needs research attention. 
With forking a possibility research should investigate the role of ownership in 
the blockchain economy. In traditional organizations owners allocate decision 
rights; however, in the blockchain economy ownership is not yet fully 
understood. Future research might analyze how ownership and decision 
rights are interwoven in the blockchain economy. 
 
Researchers should address how accountability is determined in the 
blockchain economy and investigate the role of technical and institutional 
accountability. The topic of how identity, a crucial dimension of accountability, 
is handled in the blockchain economy should also be further explored. 
Identity can be both technically and institutionally enacted in the blockchain 
economy, but research is needed to better understand the associated limits 
and trade-offs. Transaction enforcement is also a fertile area for future 
research. Since transactions that are not autonomously enforced might 
require institutional accountability, researchers should investigate the 
boundary conditions of transaction enforcement in the blockchain economy to 
determine how best to resolve problems. Another promising area for 
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research is the role of trust. Will trust even be needed anymore? Do 
individuals trust the technology, expert developers, or the institutions that are 
still present in the blockchain economy? Institutions are likely to remain 
important in the blockchain economy, but what happens when institutions are 
not needed anymore? Will they fight back against the blockchain economy?   
 
Finally, the role of incentives in the blockchain economy should be 
further explored. Among other things, research is needed to gain a better 
understanding of how incentives relate to consensus in the blockchain 
economy. What are the differences between incentive mechanisms such as 
proof-of-work and proof-of-stake? How does incentive alignment work in a 
blockchain economy that requires incentives not only for consensus, but also 
for system development, maintenance, and use? Can incentives be 
developed concurrently, how might they be interwoven, and how do 
circumstances of incentive alignment change over time? How do incentives 
affect system use in the blockchain economy? Do lower transaction fees for 
users create an incentive for system use? How can incentives be best 
provided for the development and maintenance of the blockchain economy? 
What effects do transaction fees, which may be necessary for covering costs, 
have on a blockchain? If every node in a blockchain system can use the 
blockchain, how are those who create the blockchain compensated? Can 
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blockchain offer the technological means and the incentives to make the 
creation of public goods attractive, given that traditional markets typically do 
not? Research is needed to investigate new business models for providing 
public goods, and to explore how developers might predict the needs and 
incentives of network participants. 
 
4.3. A Critical Perspective 
 
The blockchain economy is predicated on assumptions about several 
socio-technical issues that remain open to speculation. The widely heralded 
blockchain “paradise” calls for a critical stance. IS research can contribute to 
these problems only if research takes a critical view. 
 
Many promises of the blockchain economy are predicated on 
technology reducing the coordination costs of economic activities. However, 
the costs of governance in the one DAO we studied appear to be high in 
spite of smart contracts. Smart contracts are valid indefinitely, but also entail 
high risk to the involved parties due to autonomous enforcement 
mechanisms in which coding errors or changes in conditions could have 
major consequences. The negotiation of smart contracts might bring 
substantial coordination costs to mitigate such concerns. It is too simplistic to 
say that problems will be handled by smart contracts. Mechanisms must be 
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specified and subjected to serious criticism and testing. While researchers 
may produce evidence that blockchain will lower coordination costs, they 
should also study DAO governance negotiating mechanisms, and examine 
they are created and maintained. Design-oriented research should create 
solutions for the risks of smart contracts, and propose risk management 
mechanisms that reduce some of these risks. 
 
While user authentication cultivates accountability, it also invokes 
privacy concerns. These concerns could eventually be overcome, but if every 
transaction is visible in terms of the initiator and recipient, a cluster analysis 
could discern associations between different nodes. Private blockchain keys 
could be divulged, either intentionally or unintentionally, or attackers could 
eavesdrop on users. Informal exchange of transaction information could be 
linked to blockchain transaction data. Such privacy concerns are serious, 
particularly when a link is made between identities and transactions. For 
example, blockchain-based voting rests on the premise that every vote could 
be linked to the identity of the voter, making it difficult or impossible to 
guarantee anonymous voting. Pseudonyms might enable user authentication 
and thus accountability, but privacy concerns can complicate the use of 
blockchain, and trigger institutional pressures that prevent blockchain from 
realizing its ascribed potential. IS research needs to explore the 
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entanglement of accountability and privacy, studying how such issues affect 
individual human behavior such as willingness to engage in transactions on 
the blockchain.  
 
The blockchain depends on the ability to achieve consensus. This 
presumes efficacy and efficiency of consensus mechanisms. At present 
these mechanisms are flawed. Blockchain depends on consensus 
mechanisms that provide the right incentives for nodes to guarantee 
blockchain integrity. Proof-of-work, the most common consensus 
mechanism, employed by both Bitcoin and Ethereum, relies on computing 
power. This causes environmental concern. In early 2018, Bitcoin’s proof-of-
work consensus mechanism was estimated to create a yearly CO2 emission 
equivalent to one million transatlantic flights.2 This is hardly desirable if 
blockchain is to be adopted on a large scale. Research to design more 
sustainable consensus mechanisms is ongoing, but the IS research 
community should actively involve itself in this work, studying the impact of 
mechanism parameters on the integrity of the blockchain, and exploring the 
effectiveness of proof-of-work mechanisms based on remuneration vs. proof-
of-stake mechanisms that rely on sanctioning. Design-oriented research 
should craft mechanisms to provide incentives that ensure both the integrity 
                                                
2 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/17/bitcoin-electricity-usage-huge-
climate-cryptocurrency 
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of the blockchain and environmental sustainability. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we discuss how blockchain might give rise to a new type 
of economic system, which we call the blockchain economy. Whether or not 
the blockchain economy develops as hoped, the ideas it invokes raise 
important research questions. Transactions that are enforced autonomously, 
following rules in smart contracts, look quite different than transactions in the 
digital economy. We set the stage for exploring such questions by examining 
the literature on IT governance that focuses on decision rights, accountability, 
and incentives. A case study of an emerging DAO examines the blockchain 
economy, and the implications for governance on these dimensions. We offer 
a research framework and agenda for IT governance in the blockchain 
economy, and provide additional important avenues for future IS research 
through critically examining current assumptions present in the blockchain 
discourse.  
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